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THE STATUS OF POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATION
IN MINNESOTA LAW
Selected Aspects of Party Statutes and Political Dynamics
G. THFoDoRE MITAU*
This article seeks to deal with hvo questions: (1) how much
have Minnesota's formal governmental actions-incident to legis-
lated electoral reforms and the direct primary-interfered with
political party organizational autonomy, and (2) what are some of
the powers left to party autonomy as a result of recent judicial
determination.
GENERAL PRELIMINARIES
Party organization in Minnesota, as in most Midwestern states,
is typified by hierarchical arrangements of caucuses and conventions
and parallel structures of committees and officialdom. This type of
structure developed largely as an institutionalization of consequences
that were inherent in Jacksonian democracy. Masses of voters had
to be organized and trained in partisan combat to give political di-
rection, if representative government was to reflect the people's
thinking and respond to the people's demands. Just as American
democracy itself was to find its own indigenous forms and expres-
sions-similar in essence yet also noticeably different in operation
from those of its European antecedents-so this country's part),
system too was soon to take on characteristics unique to the federal
framework and quite unlike the party systems functioning within
the parliamentary and unitary traditions.
Disdained as "factions"'- by the Founding Fathers and un-
acknowledged in the U. S. Constitution, political parties in this
country were to find their legal basis in the fabric of the common
law which had affirmed and ratified the people's inherent rights
to peaceable assembly, association and petition.- "No expression," a
California Supreme Court insisted, "is needed in the declaration of
rights to the effect that electors holding certain political principles
in common may freely assemble, organize themselves into a politi-
cal party, and use all legitimate means to carry their principles of
government into active operation. . .. [S]uch a right is funda-
mental. It is inherent in the very form and substance of our govern-
*Ph.D., Professor of Political Science and Co-Chairman of the Depart-
ment, Macalester College; Visiting Professor of Political Science, University
of Nebraska.
1. The Federalist No. 10 Madison).
2. Bell v. Hill, 123 Tex. 531, 74 S. NV. 2d 113 (1934); McGrael v.
Phelps, 144 Wis. 1, 128 N. W. 1041 (1910). See also Starr, The Legal Statis
of American Political Parties, 34 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 439 (1940).
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ment and needs no expression in its constitution." 3 Some authorities
have linked a party's right to survival to the doctrine of individual
self-preservation and personal freedom. 4
The attempt of the Minnesota legislature to define a political
party mostly in terms of numerical criteria' was interpreted by the
state's Supreme Court as explicit evidence of legislative unwilling-
ness to invade the inherent rights of citizens to organize political
parties.( Similarly it was insisted by the court that although the
legislature may well pass statutes safeguarding the names of political
organizations, 7 these laws-analogous in nature to the protection
offered owners of trade marks-were in no way to be construed
as a mere legislative grant for parties to exist, for such rights are
inherent in the electorate and cannot be taken from the people.8
In the generation following the Civil War, political party organ-
ization grew more and more oligarchic in a legal setting which
treated them essentially no different from any voluntary, unincorpo-
rated, non-profit association of private citizens. By the end of the
19th century they ". . . paralleled the structure of government, en-
trenching themselves in each political unit from election precinct to
nation, seizing upon the legal institutions and determining their
tone and tendency."9
Rapid industrialization accompanied by urbanization and corpo-
rate growth offered unheard of opportunities for franchise favors
and special legislation in state house and city hall. Political oppor-
tunists could and did trade votes for wealth as popular revulsion
3. Britton v. Board of Election Commissioners, 129 Cal. 337, 344, 61 Pac.
1115, 1117 (1900).
4. As rights cognate to those of free speech and free assembly, see Aber-
nathy, The Right of Association, 6 S. C. L. Q. 32, 44 (1935) ; also see Thiede
v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 14 N. W. 2d 400 (1944).
5. Minn. Gen. Laws 1889, c. 3, § 22.
6. Davidson v. Hanson, 87 Minn. 211, 219, 91 N. W. 1124, 92 N. W. 93,
95 (1902).
7. Minn. Stat. § 205.72 (1953).
8. Davidson v. Hanson, 87 Minn. 211, 91 N. W. 1124, 92 N. W. 93, 95
(1902); Lind v. Scott, 87 Minn. 316, 92 N. W. 96 (1902); Morledge v.
Redington, 92 Minn. 98, 99 N. W. 355 (1904) ; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 213 Minn.
140, 6 N. W. 2d 47 (1942). From these cases it appears that Minnesota not
only protects the names of political parties but the names of "so-called"
political organizations as well, i.e., those groups that cannot fully qualify for
party status in terms of the specific procedural prerequisites. It also pre-
cludes the combining of "safeguarded" names with new designations such as
"Real Democrat" by candidates named by petition. Thus, in 1944, when the
Democrats fused with the Farmer-Labor party it was first necessary for the
Farmer-Laborites, in order to satisfy the statute, to change their name to
"Fellowship" party before its former name could be hyphenated with that of
the Democrats. See Holmes v. Holm, 217 Minn. 264, 14 N. W. 2d 312 (1944);
see also note 15, infra.
9, Sait, American Parties and Elections, 267-268 (2d ed., Penniman
1952).
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led to ever-increasing and persistent demands for reform. Previous
popular apathy-perhaps lack of understanding and indifference-
had permitted the nominations of candidates as well as the election
of party leaders to fall into the hands of small but highly disciplined
cliques of selfish partisans who spoke of popular sovereignty but
practiced popular irresponsibility.
Since the party's primaries represented the basis of the hierarchy
-the place of origin for nomination and election to office and to
the next higher echelons of delegate convention-the bosses increas-
ingly built fences around these primaries lest the "unrestrained"
_practice of democracy might well constitute a real threat to their
monopoly of power. This the reformers knew. Cleaner and more
responsible politics would result, so they reasoned, through state
intervention in the form of primary protective legislation. Although
state legislatures first seemed somewhat reluctant,10 there too the
forces for reform gained considerable momentum and support as
they went along. Even the usually conservative judiciary seemed
rather favorably inclined to experiment in this field.1' There were
heard, however, voices- of judicial dissent of which the following
opinion of a New York justice offers a classic example: "The right
of the electors to organize and associate themselves for the pur-
pose of choosing public officers is as absolute and .beyond legis-
lative control as their right to associate for the purpose of business
or social intercourse or recreation. The legislature may, doubtless,
forbid fraud, corruption, or intimidation or other crimes in political
organizations, the same as in business associations, but beyond this
it cannot go."'-2
Regulation of party primaries started in Minnesota in 1887.23
In 1895 precinct caucuses and party conventions were given formal
legal recognition, in the regulation of the manner of calling and con-
ducting them and the carrying out of their respective functions.21
The names of political parties were given explicit statutory protec-
tion in 19015 and at tle same time a compulsory primary election
10. Sait, op. -cit. supra note 9, at 289.
11. See Merriam, Primary Elections 104, 115; Tuttle, Linitlations upon
the Power of the Legislature to Coiitrol Political Parties and Their Pri-
maries, 1 Mich. L. Rev. 466 (1902-1903).
12. People v. Democratic Committee, 164 N. Y. 335, 349, 58 N. E. 124,
128-29 (1900) (dissenting opiniofn).
13. Minn. Gen. Laws 1887 c. 4, §§ 99-106.
14. Minn. Gen. Laws 1895, c. 276, §§ 1-11.15. Minn. Gen. Laws 1901, c. 312, §§ 1-2. A so-called "party divorce"
bill, S. F. 1608, was introduced in the Minnesota Senate, March 28, 1953,
which bill provided, among other features
, 
an amendment to Minn. Stat.§ 205.72 (1949). This legislative proposal, m effect, would have taken from
the existing political pa ies their right to the exclusive use of their names
1956]
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law was passed exempting certain offices. The law was made ap-
plicable throughout the entire state.";
Minnesota's statutory recognition of party organization reached
a peak in 1921. At that year's session the legislature spelled out in
some detail the duties of party conventions, 7 the make-up of pri-
mary election ballots with special provision for indicating the candi-
date's pre-primary party endorsements,18 and the size,' composition
and manner of electing membership to the state central committee. 20
This proved too radical an intervention into party self-government,
so most of these provisions were either repealed outright or greatly
modified in the 1923 session.2
Minnesota's present statutory definition of political parties re-
quires neither evidence-of-membership tests nor formal statements
of party platforms and principles. It restricts itself to viewing politi-
cal parties almost entirely in terms of their relationship to the
nomination process, i.e., the party's participation and role in the
primaries. Thus a party may become a party statutorily, in the first
place, if it maintains an organization in the state and its subdivisions
and if its candidates, having been voted upon in all the counties,
obtained not less than 5% of all the votes cast within the state at
the last preceding election.2
Secondly, party members with signed petitions numbering not
less than 5% of all the county's votes cast at the preceding general
election are entitled to obtain a place for their party on the primary
ballot. By way of party structure the lav stipulates a minimni: a
state central committee, congressional district committees and county
committees.23 In the absence of such organization, the party's nomi-
nees for office, state and Congressional, are permitted to meet and
elect these committees (except county committees)-,' Excepting
and permitted another new political party to appropriate any part of such a
previously safeguarded name. It would, for example, be legal under the terms
of the bill, for a political party to call itself the Democratic party as dis-
tinguished from the Democratic-Farmer-Labor party, and to have this name
printed on the official ballot. The potential political threat to the Democratic-
Farmer-Labor party inherent in such a bill, particularly in view of the state's
three party tradition, was not lost on that party's leadership. See Minneapolis
Star, April 7, 1953. Reported back to the Senate "without recommendation"
by a 5 to 4 vote of the election committee (April 1, 1953) ; the bill died in the
closing hours of the session.
16. Minn. Gen. Laws 1901, c. 216, §§ 1-11.
17. Minn. Gen. Laws 1921, c. 322, §§ 1, 10-13, 16.
18. Minn. Gen. Laws 1921, c. 322, § 2.
19. Minn. Gen. Laws 1921, c. 322, §§ 4, 15.
20. Minn. Gen. Laws 1921, c. 322, § 17.
21. Minn. Gen. Laws 1923, c. 125, §§ 1-4.
22. Minn. Stat. § 200.08 (1953).
23. Minn. Stat. § 202.10 (1953).
24. Ibid.
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statutes to the contrary-such as the provisions governing notifica-
tions and methods of call to delegate conventions s and the rather
detailed instructions for the precinct caucus-party committees, con-
ventions, and party officials were to have such powers as are cus-
tomary.0
CORRUPT PRACTICES LEGISLATION-PROBLEMS IN FOCUSING
FiscaL CONTROL
Minnesota's first comprehensive corrupt practices act was passed
in 189527 although some statutes against disorderly election con-
duct and vote corruption go back as far as 1851.2s Subsequent
amendments and additional legislation expanded the corrupt prac-
tices act along the following major lines: requirements for proper
identification and marking of political literature, 9 prohibitions
against campaign contributions by business corporations and the
"sale" of editorial support, limitations upon campaign contribu-
tions and expenses, restrictions as to the objects for which disburse-
ments may legitimately be made, specifications as to financial re-
ports and publicity to which candidates are subject.30
The over-all efficacy of such legislation both on the federal and
state level has been seriously questioned by experts for years.3 ' One
25. Minn. Stat § 202.11 (1953).
26. Minn. Stat § 202.14 (1953). Unfortunately Minnesota fails to draw
a clear terminological distinction between "primary elections" which serve as
the first echelon of electing delegates to the various levels of party delegate
conventions (county, district, and state) and "primary elections" which serve
to nominate the party's candidates for presentation at the general election.
Moreover, the choice of heading § 202.14 "Conduct of Conventions" gives
little indication upon first glance, at least, that this is the very important
statute that goyerns the conduct of the "precinct caucus"--the highly critical
entry to party influence and power.
27. Minn. Gen. Laws 1895, c. 277. The law was upheld in Saari v.
Gleason, 126 Minn. 378, 148 N. W. 293 (1914); on the historical aspects
of Minnesota's early corrupt practices statutes, see Folwell, 4 History of
Minnesota 261-283 (1930).
28. Rev. Stat of Territory of Minn. 1851, c. 6.
29. In one of the state's most notorious and bitter political battles, the
Nelson-Kindred campaign of 1882, Mr. Nelson was epitomized in an unsigned
circular as follows:
"He is'an infidel.
He don't believe in God.
He don't keep his promises to man.
He is not an American. I
He persecutes church people."
Adams, The Nelson-Kindred Campaign of 1882, 5 Minnesota History Bulletin
103 (1923).
30. Minn. Stat §§ 211.01-211.21 (1953).
31. Pollock, Party Campaign Funds 260 (1926) ; Overacker, Money in
Elections c. 13 (1932) ; see also "Campaign Expenditures," Hearings before
the, Special House Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess., 119 (1952) and Hearings before the Subcoinittee on
Privileges and Elections of the Senate Conmittee on Rules and Adninistra-
tion, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
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particular phase of the corrupt practices problem-of great im-
portance to political parties-is that of unrealistically low and rigid
limitations of campaign contributions and the exceedingly detailed
yet ineffective control of the objects of disbursements. This repre-
sents one of the most severely criticized aspects of such legislation."
Unlike Britain, where the corrupt practices statutes and the laws
of agency have been very restrictively interpreted so as to prevent
the expenditure of money on behalf of the candidate without his
express approval,33 American statutes and courts have generally
not charged the candidate with responsibility for expenditures made
by groups and individuals on his behalf and even with his knowl-
edge.3 4 This also appears to be the law in Minnesota. The Minnesota
court has ruled that while authority for such an act may, under a
principal-agent relationship, either be express or implied, it must
be shown explicitly that the candidate has personal knowledge of
or had consented to the specific disbursement before he could be
held personally responsible." In a subsequent corrupt practices
violation case the court held that even where "the candidate himself
was a dues-paying member of the association, and fully aware of
the advertising support given him in the association's newspaper,"
the test had to be a specific request given either directly or indirectly.
Absent such action, the candidate could not be held liable on an
agency basis for failure to include such service in his statement of
expenses 386
The focusing of fiscal responsibility in the realm of campaign
finance is made more difficult by another feature of Minnesota's
corrupt practices legislation which permitted judicial interpretation
so as actually to discriminate in favor of the so-called "volunteer"
committees. The law, the court held, "prescribes the purposes for
which a candidate, his personal campaign committee, and a party
committee may disburse money or incur indebtedness in the cam-
paign, [and] limits the amount to be so expended [but] the law
32. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups 559 (1952) ; McKean,
Party and Pressure Politics 361 (1949) ; for a careful analysis of some of the
legal problems involved in establishing effective expenditure limitations with
particular reference to Minnesota law, see Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 156 (1956).
33. Butler, The Electoral System in Britain 9 (1953) ; Carter, Ranney &
Herz, Major Foreign Powers 63 (1952) ; see also McKenzie, British Political
Parties 165 (1955). Campaign expenditures when made on behalf of a
political party rather than on behalf of a particular candidate are not subject
to fixed limitations. See Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 156 (1956) ; Note, 66 Harv.
L. Rev. 1259 (1953).
34. Sait, American Parties and Elections 565 (2d ed., Penniman 1952).
35. Mariette v. Murray, 185 Minn. 620, 625, 242 N. W. 331 (1932).
36. Trones v. Olson, 197 Minn. 21, 265 N. W. 806 (1936).
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places no definite limit upon the amount of money which such a
[volunteer] committee may raise, collect, or expend."37
Thus mi Minnesota law, it is the volunteer campaign committee,
largely independent of political parties and candidates, that has be-
come a judicially acknowledged vehicle for legally raising, collecting
and 'disbursing funds outside the fixed limitations of the corrupt
practices act. This discrimination in favor of the volunteer com-
mittee may represent a judicially sanctioned adjustment to inade-
quate and, overly rigid statutory campaign limitations or to the pecu-
liar divorce of responsibility between the candidate and his sup-
porters which certainly characterizes the realities of American
politics. If, however, the legislative end is to be a more responsible
party system or a more effective corrupt practices code, then such
development in the direction of possible financial irresponsibility
may well call for additional legislati%,e attention.8
Two rather significant and unique efforts to encourage and
regularize political campaign finances, other than by way of the
customary corrupt practices statutes, were made in the 1955 session
of the Minnesota legislature 9 First, subject to specified limits,'0
contributions to political parties, candidates or causes, made by indi-
viduals, party national committeemen or committeewomen, congres-
sional district party committee members, and by county chairmen
and chairwomen, may be taken as credits against taxable net in-
come.41 Second, candidates for public office, both state and federal,
were" permitted to deduct from gross income specified amounts42 in
computing their net incomes.43
37. Mariette v. Murray, 185 Minn. 620, 623, 242 N. W. 331, 332 (1932).
38. For a very similar conclusion see Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 156, 167
(1956). The legislatures of Florida and Texas have recently passed legislation
removing fixed campaign limitations and providing for candidate-centered
control over campaign expenditures. Ibid.; see also Roady, Floriddas New
Campaign Expense Law and the 1952 Democratic Gubernatorial "Prinaries,
48 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 465 (1954).
39. "... [B]eing considered in Washington is the Minnesota innovation
which permits income tax deductions for personal political gifts of moderate
size. This is also intended to encourage public participation in politics. It is
likely that such a proposal will be introduced in Congress next year." Edi-
torial, St. Paul Pioneer Press, December 16, 1955.
40. Contributions by individual natural persons--100.00; national com-
mitteeman, national committeewoman, state chairman or state chairwoman-
$1000.00; congressional district committeeman or committeewoman--V50.00;
county chairman or chairwoman-$150.00.
41. Minn. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 775, amending Mim. Stat. § 290.21, 290.09(1953).
42. For governor or U. S. Senator--$5000.00; for other state office or
U. S. Representative---$3,500.00; for State Senator, State Representative, or
presidential elector at large-$500.00; for presidential elector from a con-
gressional district-$100.00; and for any other public office-4 the annual
salary.
43. Minn. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 775, amending Minn. Stat. 290.09 (1953).
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MINNESOTA'S OPEN PRIMARY AND TIE ISSUE OF PARTY
RESPONSIBILITY
Minnesota's tradition of the very moderately closed, 41 and since
1933,4 5 outright open primary sought to assure the voter the widest
possible access to the direct primary-access free from any identify-
ing party tests and registration requirements whatever.40 This is
now the law with respect to all direct primary elections in the state
with the possible exception of the Presidential Preferential Pri-
mary Law. 47 In the regular Minnesota primary election, the voter
upon receiving one consolidated ballot containing the various party
tickets, must then select the party within which he wishes to make
his choice. But he cannot, as he might well under the provisions of
the "blanket" or 'Washington State-type primary, pick his choices
from among the candidates of more than one party. If he were to do
this in Minnesota his ballot would be declared void.48
Whether or not the direct primary has in effect tended to weaken
party responsibility and if so to what extent, represents questions
which have occupied civic leaders, journalists, legislators, party poli-
ticians, and students of government for many years'.4 Those gen-
44. Minn. Gen. Laws 1899, c. 349 §§ 16, 17 ("open" primary law)
changed by Minn. Gen. Laws 1901, c. 216, § 16 into a moderately "closed" or
"challenge type": "All persons entitled to registration as voters in the
election district on the day of the primary election ... shall be entitled to par-
ticipate in the primary election ... shall be entitled ... to receive a ballot of
the political party with which he then declares (under oath, if his right
thereto is challenged) that he affiliated, and whose candidates he generally
supported at the last general election, and with which party he proposes to
affiliate at the next election." This is often called "moderately closed" in view
of the very rigid type of provisions with which some other closed primaries
are surrounded. Oregon might serve as an illustration of such a system:
"Every elector shall be asked by the clerk . . . of what political party or
voluntary political organization he is a member, and it shall be the elector's
duty to answer said question if he wishes to take part in making the nomina-
tion of any political party, and his answer shall there and then be entered
in the register. . . ." Ore. Laws 1905, c. 1, § 38.
45. Minn. Gen. Laws 1933, c. 244, § 5.
46. Minn. Stat. § 206.17 (1953). ". .. [N]o entry, nor notation shall be
made in such (election) . . . register ... showing to which party any voter
belonged or which political party ballot he voted nor shall the judges knowing-
ly permit any other person within the polling place to make such an entry
or notation." Similar provisions may be found in the laws of Idaho, Michigan,
Montana, North Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin.
47. Minn. Sess. Laws 1949, c. 433, § 9, as amended Minn. Sess. Laws
1951, c. 156, § 1. The Attorney General ruled that the law's provision calling
for "separate" ballots for each party meant that "a voter in communities using
paper ballots at presidential primary elections is required to name his party
choice in order to obtain proper ballot." Ops. Atty. Gen., 28-C-5 (1952). At
the time of this writing the court has not ruled on this question.
48. Minn. Stat. § 206.15 (1953).
49. On the "pros" and "cons" see the following as rather representative
treatments: 106 Annals (1923) ; Key. op. cit. supra note 32 at 411; Sait,
op. cit. supra note 34, c. 13, 19; David, Moos, and Goldman, Presidential
Nominating Politics in 1952 (1953).
[ Vol. '10:561
POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATION
erally favorable to political party organization and party responsi-
bility attack the direct primary and more particularly the open
primary with arguments such as the following: that it weakens
party organizations by permitting "outsiders," voters unsympathetic
with the party's principles and leadership, to pick candidates often
entirely unrepresentative of the party and its sentiments; that it
tends to crowd the field of candidates by offering incentives to pub-
licity seekers and the wealthy; that it tends to prevent the parties
from properly tying candidates to platforms and "issues" and thus
precludes the development of party government which is so neces-
sary to render our political institutions more responsible, issue-
centered, and mature.
Those who support the direct primary as a method of nominating
candidates often emphasize that it tends to decrease the sense of
narrow partisanship by placing the interest of country and good
government above that of party; that rather than weakening the
political parties, 'it takes the power irresponsibly exercised by
party bosses and "palace guards," and returns it to the people who
want it (and to whom the party and its leadership should have been
responsible in the first place). They further argue that it offers an
opportunity for, political independents to help choose those candi-
dates most qualified, regardless of party label or affiliation; that the
direct primary- has won the people's confidence and support ;50 that
even if political parties were now weaker than before (and there is
wide-spread disagreement on this point) the direct primary itself
was less cause than symptom in that a party organization well
organized and responsible should have nothing to "fear" from the
electorate.
Then, thirdly, there are those, perhaps best represented by Pro-
fessor Penniman, who maintain that much of the argument con-
cerning the effect of primaries upon political party strength or weak-
nesses reveals a serious confusion of cause and effect. Political
parties should be strong and well organized for responsible govern-
ment in a democracy. This requires, above all, a radical reduction in
50. This argument is presently in the forefront in discussions favoring
the enactment of some form of presidential preferential primary legislation;
the "Gallup Poll" of July 1952 showed the following: 73% pro presidential
primary, 1617 favoring the present convention system, 1196 undecided. The
"California Poll" in the Berkeley (Cal.) Daily Gazette, August 14, 1952:
69%6 pro presidential primary (67% Dent, 7296 Rep.), 20% prefer the present
convention system (21%o Dent, 18%7 Rep.), 11%7 undecided; the "Minnesota
Poll," Minneapolis Sunday Tribune, March 30, 1952, 6796 pro presidential
primary (68%o Mfen, 65%o Women), 13%6 disapprove of a presidential prefer-
ential primary (16%o Mlen, 10%6 Women), 19%6 "no opinion," 15% qualified;
Minneapolis Morning Tribune, April 9, 1955, 637o approve of a presidential
preferential primary (61% Men, 65% Women), 2376 "disapprove" (26%
Mlen, 19% Women) ; 149o "no opinion."
1956]
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the number of elective positions for public office. As in Great Britain,
only those of a truly policy-determining nature should be voted
upon. If this were done, parties should and could help the voter to
acquaint himself with the issues and assist in making possible a
more meaningful selection of candidates. Under conditions such
as these and ". . . with the restoration of a robust party spirit, the
non partisan primary will lend itself readily enough to party
interests." 51
Some Major Studies and Findings
Professor Pollock in his study of the operation of the open
primary in Michigan found no evidence that it weakened party re-
sponsibility. 52 A more cautious report is submitted by Professor
V. 0. Key of Harvard whose findings seem to point to a "... trend
toward a weakening political leadership within the stronger party in
the district, and to at least a net decline in cohesion of the inner core
of the stronger party with of course local exceptions."'5 Neither
Professor Pollock in his Michigan study5 4 nor Professor Ogden in
his analysis of the Washington blanket-type primary found any
serious evidence of "party raiding."55 Where voters do invade the
other party's primaries, this is done not as a Machiavellian tactic
but because of the voter's wish to support the candidate in the
general election as well.56 But in an earlier study of the Washington
primary, it was found that if such a stronger candidate did not then
win the nomination, the voter would immediately return to his
party and vote for his own party's nominee in the general election.5
Professor Starr commenting in the 1930's on "party-raiding"
in Minnesota saw "little evidence of this kind of cross voting," and
this despite carefully organized and dues-paying membership in the
Farmer-Labor Association which he felt might well have found an
invasion of one of the other major parties tactically useful.5 8
51. Sait, op. cit. supra note 34 at 415.
52. Pollock, Michigan Politics in Transition (1942) ; this corresponds
to the findings of earlier studies by Professor Horack in Iowa and Professor
Guild in Indiana. See 106 Annals 148, 172 (1923).
53. Key, The Direct Primary and Party Structure--A Study of State
Legislative Nominations, 48 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 14 (1954).
54. Pollock, op. cit. supra note 52 at 60.
55. Ogden, The Blanket Primary and Party Regularity in Washington,
39 Pacific North West Quarterly 34 (1948). "During a 12 year period, out of
34 offices for which nominatees were selected by each voter in only 4 instances
is there any evidence that significant numbers of voters crossed party lines."
56. Pollock, op. cit supra note 52 at 60; Ogden, op. cit. supra note 55 at
38. See also Ogden, Waslngton's Popular Primary, 19 Research Studies of
the State College of Washington 160 (1951).
57. Johnson, Claudis 0., The Washington Blanket Primary, 33 Pacific
Northwestern Quarterly 37, 38 (1942).
58. Starr, Labor and Farmer Groups and the Three Party System 17
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 18 (1936).
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On the other hand, raiding has occurred even within the frame-
work of Minnesota's moderately dosed primaries (pre-1933) in a
crisis situation as classically illustrated by the efforts of the Non-
Partisan League from 1916 through 1920. Those were the years
when the League, under Townley's leadership, successfully invaded
the direct primary of the Republican Party not only in North Da-
kota but in Minnesota and Wisconsin as well. That era's most acri-
monious primary contest probably occurred in Minnesota in 1918 in
the Burnquist-Lindbergh battle for the Republican Party's guber-
natorial nomination. No holds were barred. From the political left
came the Non-Partisan Leaguers in support of Lindbergh. Con-
servative Democrats responding "... . to the call of the Twin City
dailies... asking [them] to vote in the Republican primaries for
Burnquist," invaded from the right and so helped assure Lind-
bergh's defeat.5 9
Under the present open primary law, it is not enough for the
parties in this state to concern themselves with the problems of
"raiding" and "invading" merely when statewide direct primary
elections are held. Equally important, they must guard the integrity
of their precinct caucuses. Any voter may participate in such a
caucus if he satisfies the judges with respect to the follbwing two
stipulations: (1) that he affiliated or voted with such party at the last
general election, and (2) that he intends so to vote and affiliate at
the ensuing election. 60 These "tests" have, however, little practical
significance in the absence of an effective general party registration
system.
Just how much of a serious threat "invasions," if well organized,
can pose to a major party was recently well illustrated by the
events occurring in Minnesota in the Spring of 1948. The Wallace-
Benson faction, although nationally already committed to a third
party movement, sought in this state to seize the Democratic-
Farmer-Labor party instead, by gaining control of the party's pre-
cinct caucuses and conventions. 61 As a tactic, it proved unsuccessful
only after a most bitterly fought struggle in which nearly every
precinct caucus, county and district convention, and finally the state
convention itself became a battleground for the rival factions.
Developments such as these certainly tend to substantiate the
position taken by some of the leading party experts in American
59. Morlan, The Nonpartisan League and the Minnesota Campaign of
1918, 34 Minnesota History 231 (1955).
60. Minn. Stat. § 202.14 (1935).
61. St Paul Pionedr Press, April 19, 29 (1948).
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political science. In preferring the "closed" over the "open" type
of primary, they concluded that the former deserved preference be-
cause ". . . it is more readily compatible with the development of a
responsible party system . . . [since] . . . it tends to support the
concept of the party as an association of like minded people . . .
[whereas] the open primary tends to destroy the concept of mem-
bership as the basis of party organization.
0 2
Even this very brief analysis of some of the literature dealing
with the relationship of primaries to party organizations necessarily
leaves a number of notable difficulties. There are important prac-
tical distinctions between the open, closed and blanket-type pri-
maries, but there is altogether a paucity of empirical evidence.0u
There remains the use of such imprecise language as "party
strength," "party weakness," and "party responsibility." If to these
be added the American political tradition of "non-ideological poli-
tics,"6  of "localism," of pride in political independency and the
constitutional doctrines of separation of power and dual federalism,
it becomes obvious why it is impossible at this stage for the science
of politics to provide more categorical answers-if such be desired.
Meanwhile, the great laboratory of American politics continues to
experiment with these various types of primaries in the complex
process of adjusting and harmonizing competing interests and
factions. In this process legislative experimentation with primaries
represents but one aspect of the larger picture in which state parties
and candidates seek to build the winning coalition which, after all,
constitutes if not the essence then the sine qua non of all political
objectives and the aim of all organizational effort.
Pre-Primary Endorsements
Minnesota's statutory experimentation with electoral reforms
and party legislation reached something of a peak in the early nine-
teen twenties. It was the 1921 legislature, to be specific, which
62. Towards a More Responsible Party System, 44 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
Supp. 71 (1950). The Committee that made these recommendations had the
following membership: Thomas S. Barclay, Stanford University; Clarence
A. Berdahl, University of Illinois; Hugh A. Bone, University of Washington;
Franklin L. Burdette, University of Maryland; Paul T. David, Brookings
Institution; Merle Fainsod, Harvard University; Bertram M. Gross, Council
of Economic Advisors to the President; E. Allen Helms, Ohio State Univer-
sity; E. M. Kirkpatrick, Department of State; John W. Lederle, University
of Michigan; Fritz Morstein Marx, American University; J. B. Shannon,
University of Kentucky; Louise Overacker, Wellesley College; Howard
Penniman, Department of State (Yale University) ; Kirk H. Porter, State
University of Iowa; E. E. Schattschneider, Wesleyan University, Chair-
man.
63. Key, The Direct Primary and Party Structure, 48 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 1 (1954).
64. See Truman, The Governmental Process 262-287 (1951).
[ Vol. 40:561
1956] POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATION 573
authorized state and local party conventions to endorse candidates
prior to the primary election and have such endorsements shown on
the ballot.6 5 After the extensive repeals of 1923 (which included the
pre-primary endorsement system) ,6 some of the past actions that
aimed at weakening the political "machines" were subjected, many
years later, to a long and serious second sober thought by various
political forces in this state. Within the ranks of the newly fused
Democratic-Farmer-Labor party, the Humphrey-Freeman led fac-
tion urged a pre-primary endorsement 6f candidates for the major
state offices as a device of building a more effective party within the
framework of the state's open primary. Despite regular and heated
convention floor fights with factions of opposing points of view,
this has become that party's general rule and practice, at least since
the Brainerd convention of 1948.67
The following table offers a brief summary of the success
and failure of that party's ten year practice of pre-primary endorse-
ments.
6 s
No. of
No. of such Percentage
such candidates increase or
No. of=  No. of candidates victorious Total of decrease
major DFL victorious in the DFL party over
primary endorsed in the general ballots preceding
Year contests candidates primary election cast election
1944 ...... 10 9 6 1 103,480
1946 ...... 10 8 7 2 122,550 plus 184%
1948 ...... 14 14 10 4 234,229 plus 91.1%
1950 ...... 9 9 5 070 231,770 minus 1.0%
1952 ...... 12 12 11 3 252,355 plus 8.1%
1954 ...... 12 11 11 8 351,389 plus 392%
Total number of DFL endorsed candidates (1944-1954) ................63
Total number of such candidates victorious in the primaries (1944-1954)..50
Therefore, percentage of endorsed candidates "successful" ........... 79t%
65. Minn. Gen. Lars 1921, c. 322, § 2.
66. Minn. Gen. Laws 1923, c. 125.
67. See Constitution of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minne-
sota,' Article VI, section 2 (Adopted in Convention, June 12, 13, 1948,
Brainerd, Minnesota.)
68. The data shown in this table are based on the election returns as
reported in the Legislative Manual for the appropriate year. The formal
documentary basis for the "pre-primary" endorsements of individual candi-
dates however, was found to be the most inadequate. The "record of endorse-
ments" had -to be reconstructed. In the absence of complete newspaper
coverage-especially in cases of Congressional district convention endorse-
ment--and missing convention records, some of the information on endorse-
ments had to be obtained on basis of personal memory of those who partici-
pated prominently in the events of a particular 'campaign. The assistance of
the Executive Secretary of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor party State Cen-
tral Committee is hereby gratefully acknowledged.
69. The contests for such offices as Clerk of the Supreme Court and for
the short terms of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission are not included.
70. The four Democratic-Farmer-Labor incumbent U. S. Representa-
tives from the third, fourth, sixth, and eighth Congressional districts ld no
primary opposition and continued to win their seats in the general election.
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Two observations appear to be in order. First, the over-all ten
year figure of 79o success at the primary for Democratic-Farmer-
Labor pre-primary endorsed candidates seems rather impressive.
This is true not only in view of Minnesota's open primary statute
but more so in terms of the party's relatively short history and the
intensity of its internal factional struggles.
Secondly, it is interesting to note also that the one year (1950)
in which the total number of ballots cast for the Democratic-Farmer-
Labor party showed a percentage decline was also the most unsuc-
cessful year with reference to the number of pre-primary endorsed
candidates winning in either the primary or the general election.
Among those defeated in the primary were candidates for such im-
portant offices as that of Lieutenant Governor, State Treasurer, and
Railroad and Warehouse Commissioner.
Thirdly, the recency of the Minnesota presidential preferential
statute-its distinct political problems and its administration sepa-
rate from that of the direct state-wide primary-made it unwise to
include the results from its 1952 operation in the above analysis and
in'this article generally.
The Republican party in Minnesota has not favored the principle
of formal pre-primary endorsements. Its state central committee,
meeting on September 24, 1955, considered such a motion but tabled
it with the recommendation that the matter be taken up by the
party's district conventions. 71 When the issue was again presented
to the state central committee it was turned down without further
discussion with only the eighth congressional district having voted
in favor of such pre-primary endorsements.72
Pre-primary party endorsements are legal in this state even for
offices that are filled by election on a non-party designated ballot.
"In our democratic system of government," the Minnesota Supreme
Court held .... "absent constitutional and statutory provisions to
the contrary, there is nothing wrong in groups or political parties
doing their utmost within the scope of propriety to advance the
candidacy of an individual satisfactory to them.""3
THE NON-PARTY DESIGNATED MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE
The non-partisan method of electing members to the state legis-
lature has also been made the subject of serious re-appraisal. This
71. Correspondence, dated November 9, 1955, Minnesota Republican
State Central Committee.
72. Minneapolis Sunday Tribune, December 4, 1955.
73. Moon v. Halverson, 206 Minn. 331, 334, 288 N. W. 579, 581 (1939).
Loring, J., in a concurring opinion severely criticized the Minnesota legis-
lature for failure to forbid party endorsement of every non-political candidate,
particularly judgeships. Id. at 336, 288 N. W. at 586 (concurring opinion).
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method had been a somewhat incidental legislative by-product of a
complicated maneuver in which the "wets" had hoped to undermine
the hostility of certain standpat Republican leaders to "local
option. 74
Farmer-Labor leadership in the nineteen thirties, for one, looked
at the non-partisan method of electing legislators with increasing
antagonism and demanded its repeal at various conventions. In
discussing this period and in an analysis of the Farmer-Labor
party's failure to capture the legislature, Professor Naftalin attrib-
uted this failure largely to a lack of party discipline and to the
observation that ". . . the non-partisanly elected legislator, left to his
own judgment, finds Conservative affiliation an easier matter be-
cause it requires no positive avowal on his part in support of a
definite program_ . 75 The Stassen segment of the Republican
party was to observe similarly that the non-partisanly elected legis-
lature even though under conservative leadership, greatly compli-
cated the enactment of its party's legislative objectives. In his
gubernatorial message of 1943 Mr. Stassen recommended its re-
peal,7 6 and since 1944 it has become a formal plank in the Republican
party's state platform.
Yet despite the calls for repeal by the leaders and platforms of
both major parties, strong forces in both legislative caucuses (more
numerous in the ranks of the conservative caucus) have been quite
successful in preventing a return to the pre-1913 status. Also, with
the exception of certain committed groups such as the parties, the
League of Women Voters, and various labor unions" public senti-
ment in the state at large has reflected, in all but one of the opinion
polls, a remarkable insistence to cling to the present system.78
74. See Adrian, The Origins of Minnwsotda Non-Partisan Legislature,
33 Minnesota History 155 (1952); the Minneapolis Journal of May 17, 1912
called it not a reform move but "... the desperate act of a beaten man [the
governor]."
75. Naftalin, The Failure of the Farmer-Labor Party to Capture Con-
trol of the Minwsota Legislature, 38 Am. PoL Sc. Rev. 78 (1944).
76. Minneapolis Star Journal, January 6, 1943.
77. Fjelstad, How About Party Label, 44 Natil. Munic. Rev. 363 (1955).
78. See Minnesota Poll
"Do you favor or oppose the election of legislators with party designa-
tion?"
February 1946 (a) March 1947 (b) July 1954 (c) February 1955 (d)
Favor 41% D* = 59% D 41% D
45% R** 56% R 45% R
Oppose 38% D 33% D 30% D 47% D
46% R 43% R 36%R 46% R
Undecided 21% D x)= 11% D 11% D
9% R x~cx 8% R 8% R
*Roosevelt voters.
**Dewey voters.
(This footnote continued on next page)
19516]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
A "party label" bill with an amendment to include county officers
was defeated in the House of the 1955 legislature by a vote of 68 to 62.
Of the two caucuses, the conservatives provided nearly twice as
many negative votes, 44 to the 24 cast by the liberals."' Thus the
legislators remain without party designation, and the party remains
with little control over them.
SOME JUDICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS OF THE RIGHTS OF PARTY
ORGANIZATIONS TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
In upholding the constitutionality of Minnesota's primary law 0
the Supreme Court considered such statutory interference with
party autonomy to be justified largely as a method of protecting the
voter against ". . . the corrupt control by party managers of caucuses
and conventions,"' s8 and of securing ". . . a pure and orderly election
[free from] . . . unfair combinations, undue influence, and coer-
cion."'8 2 The courts did not wish to question the utility"8 of politi-
cal party conventions, since their committees and duly elected offi-
cials had in Anglo-American law and experience s long been allowed
"Do you favor or oppose the election of legislators with party designa-
tion ?"
March 1945 (a) February March 1947 (b) July 1948 (c) February
1946(a) 1955 (d)
Favor 16% 43% 39% 53% 38%
Oppose 70% 40% 46% 37% 50%
Undecided 14% 17% 15% 10% 11%
Makes no
difference 1%
(a) Minneapolis Sunday Tribune, February 24, 1946.
(b) Minneapolis Sunday Tribune, March 2,1947.
(c) Minneapolis Sunday Tribune, July 4, 1954.
(d) Minneapolis Morning Tribune, February 11, 1955.
79. Among the representatives voting against party designation only two
came from the state's thirty-five larger cities; see Cowles, John R., Jr., in
Minneapolis Star, February 16, 1955.
80. State ex rel. Fitz v. Jensen, 86 Minn. 18, 89 N. W. 1126 (1902):
State ex rel. Gulden v. Johnson, 87 Minn. 221, 91 N. W. 604, 840 (1902) ; Lind
v. Scott, 87 Minn. 316, 92 N. W. 96 (1902) ; State ex rel. Thompson v. Scott,
99 Minn. 145, 108 N. W. 828 (1906) ; State ex rel. Brady v. Bates, 102 Minn.
104, 112 N. W. 1026 (1907) ; see also Sargent, The Law of Primary Elections,
2 Minn .L. Rev. 97 (1917).
81. State ex rel. McCarthy v. Moore, 87 Minn. 308, 311, 92 N. W. 4, 5
(1902).
82. State ex rel. Nordin v. Erickson, 119 Minn. 152, 156, 137 N. W. 385,
386 (1912).
83. State ex rel. McCarthy v. Moore, 87 Minn. 308, 311, 92 N. W. 4, 5
(1902).
84. See 18 Am. Jur., Elections §§ 132, 143 (1938). "One of the things
that impressed all early travelers in the U. S. was the capacity for extra-
legal, voluntary association.... [T]his power of the pioneers to join together
for a common end and without the intervention of governmental institutions
was one of their marked characteristics." Turner, Middle Western Pioncer
Democracy, 3 Minnesota History Bulletin 400 (1919-1920). Also see Schle-
singer, Biography of a Nation of Joiners 50 American History Review I
(1944).
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the customary powers of self-government insofar as they have not
been restricted or prohibited by statute.85 Thus the Minnesota court
has said that ".. . a political convention... has control over its own
proceedings and officers, in the absence of statutory regulations, and
may proceed according to its own party usages and customs."188 Even
when there is appropriate legislation, the statutory language must
be explicit to the contrary before the courts can intervene in the
conduct of a political party delegate convention. 7In a case arising out of intra-party factional disputes, a recent
Minnesota Supreme Court decision further developed this concept
of organizational autonomy by holding significantly that ".... once
a political party convention is called in accordance with statute, it
is the judge of the election, qualifications, and returns of its own
members .. . ," and that it, does not even require . .. the presence of
a majority of all persons entitled to participate in order to constitute
a quorum for the transaction of business and that those actually
assembling constitute a quorum. "The withdrawal of either a ma-
jority or minority does not affect the right of those remaining to
proceed with the business of the convention, and those withdraw-
ing cannot claim to be the legal party of the convention." 8
This important case grew out of developments resulting from
two state delegate conventions held by two bitterly opposed Demo-
cratic-Farmer-Labor party factions. Tactically and ideologically,
they represented the local counterpart of the national struggle be-
tween President Truman and Mr. H. A. Wallace." The Humphrey
"right wing" delegates had met in their convention at Brainerd
and voted in effect not to seat the Wallace-Benson group whom
85. Starr, The Legal Basis of Anerican Political Parties, 34 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 445, 447 (1940).-86. Phillips v. Gallagher, 73 Minn. 528, 534, 76 N. AV. 285, 287 (1898).
87. Manston v. McIntosh, 58 Minn. 525, 60 N. W. 672 (1894) ; White v.
Sanderson, 74 Minn. 118, 76 N. NV. 1021 (1898).
88. Democratic-Farmer-Labor State Central Committee v. Holm, 227
Minn. 52, 55-56, 33 N. W. 2d 831, 833 (1948); in these factional dispute
cases the Minnesota Supreme Court appears to have taken a rather consistent
position reflecting also the majority holding in other jurisdictions throughout
the U. S. See Whipple v. Brad, 25 Colo. 407, 55 Pac. 172 (1898). However, in
another recent case, where an important factional dispute had reached beyond
party councils, and centered around a statutory regulation fixing the time for
filing nominAtion papers for the position of U. S. Senator, a divided court
construed contradictory legislative language broadly, ".. . statutory regula-
tion of the elective franchise must be so construed as to insure rather than
defeat full exercise thereof." Allen v. Holm, 66 N. W. 2d 610, 614 (fMinn.
1954). The effect of this decision permitted a prominent member of the
Democratic-Farmer-Labor party, defeated at the primary for the office of
attorney general, to file again now as an "Independent Liberal" and so
challenge Senator Hubert Humphrey at the general election.
89. Mitau,, The De~kocratic-Fariner-Labor Party Schism of 1948, 34
Minnesota History 187 (1955).
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they considered to be Communist supported and outside the Demo-
cratic party?0 A Minneapolis rump convention was called simul-
taneously by the Wallace state leaders. Both factions then claimed
to represent the true Democratic-Farmer-Labor party with each
seeking to place its own slate of presidential electors upon the state's
general election ballot."' The state Supreme Court in Democratic-
Farmer-Labor State Central Committee v. Holm resolved the issue
in favor of the "right wing" slate pledged to Mr. Truman. It may be
shown that in some measure at least, the state court actually yielded
back to political party councils and conventions, powers of expulsion
not readily acknowledged in similar unincorporated voluntary asso-
ciations. In one such recent expulsion case the court held: ". . . the
absence of express provisions for due process of law is not decisive.
... [C]onstitutions and bylaws relating to such matters are con-
strued ... so as to require specification of charges, notice, and hear-
ing. The law implies or imposes requirements for due process where
an association's rules are silent with respect to the matter.
'
1112
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Minnesota political party organizations-formerly voluntary,
non-profit associations in the common law-lost through statutory
intervention considerable areas of their one time nearly autono-
mous status. Ballot and primary laws in effect integrated parties into
tle nomination and election processes giving to parties legal recog-
nition and quasi-governmental functions.
In the name of better politics and reform, the parties' fiscal
powers were restricted, their primaries opened to all comers and the
principle of non-partisanship extolled. In effect Minnesota law seems
to have drawn a dividing line between the external relations of the
party organizations-particularly their relation to the nomination
process-and the internal problems of party self-government.
In the former, interventions have been relatively heavy, whereas,
in the latter, party organizations have been able to retain important
areas of autonomy. Fiscal controls embodied in the Corrupt Prac-
tices Acts have tended to diffuse party responsibility in financial
90. L. D. Parlin in Pioneer Press, June 13, 1948.
91. Carl Henneman, Pioneer Press, June 13,, 14, 1948; see also Mime-
apolis Star, June 14, 1948.
92. Mixed Local of Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union Local 458
v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 212 Minn. 587, 592, 4 N. W. 2d 771, 775
(1942) ; see also Strong v. Minneapolis Automobile Trade Assn., 151 Minn.
406, 186 N. W. 800 (1922) ; Burmaster v. Alwin, 138 Minn. 383, 165 N. W.
135 (1917) ; Stevens v. Minneapolis Fire Departtrent Relief Assn., 124 Mili,.
381. 145 N. W. 35 (1914).
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matters. Although the open primary has in some respect made it
more difficult for party leadership to tie issues to candidates, the
law in this state does not appear to have made it impossible for the
organizations to carry their endorsed candidates successfully
through the direct open primary (not the presidential preferential
primary) nor does it seem to preclude parties from preserving a
considerable amount of organizational integrity even in the face of
well organized "invasions." Minnesota law thus presents a fairly
flexible background for the interesting struggle of the parties to
maintain and increase this integrity.
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